defences as set up in article 31 of the Statute, this article has two main purposes. First, to appreciate whether the Rome Statute represents a codification of existing laws or an evolution of the ground to exclude criminal responsibility in international law. To this purpose, this article analyses the relevant sources and content of international criminal law, thus explores the defences of insanity, intoxication, self-defence and duress as recognised in article 31 of the Statute. Secondly, this paper is aimed at scrutinising the confusion that has been raised concerning such grounds of exclusion in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. One of the issues during the Rome Conference was to define what sort of defences would be acceptable in the Statute to exclude the criminal responsibility of person who by definition would be responsible for the "most horrible crimes". There has been much confusion between defences and negation of responsibility. The present article seeks to highlight that the recognition of grounds to exclude criminal responsibility and the negation of crimes are two different notions. Overall, the purpose is to show that allowing defences based on the recognition of the "human fragility" within the Statute does not mean the ignorance of the horrible character of the crimes. It is not because the ICC deals with the most heinous crimes, that persons accused must be recognised culpable with no possibility to prove that their intention was not criminal. Ultimately, a different view would be contrary to the evolution of criminal law and human rights law.
I. A Long Way to Rome
The first international war crimes tribunal established by the Nuremberg Charter provided that the accused have "the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him".
2 Nevertheless, the Charter did not give any definition or list of the defences permissible. The only exception was with regard to the defence of superior orders. 3 Control Council Law No. 10 also dealt solely with the defence of superior order. 4 In terms of the jurisprudence, the Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals points out that most of the pleas before war crimes tribunal include three categories of arguments. The argument that the accused acted under superior orders (plea of superior orders), the argument that the accused acted under a threat to himself (plea of duress), and the argument that the crime was for the accomplishment of a military mission (plea of military necessity). 5 The 1949 Geneva Conventions make no reference to specific defences in case of war crimes. 6 The 1948 Genocide Convention includes only one provision relating to the defence of head of State immunity and declares it to be inadmissible. 7 The December 1997 that the Preparatory Committee had titled a general provision "grounds for excluding criminal responsibility".
12
A large part of the drafting debates focused on the question of the inscription of the defences as possible factors of mitigation or of exclusion of responsibility. Amnesty
International advocated a clear-cut distinction between the two notions; duress or superior orders would have been mitigating factors only. 13 The non-governmental organisation affirmed that under international law there was a precedent for the exclusion of a codification of specific defences regarding the gravity of the offences.
One of the major issues was to appreciate whether defences should be regarded as a justification or excuse. 14 A defence could be seen either as justifying acts that would have been criminal (justification) or as excusing the accused that have acted criminally (excuses). The Rome Statute favours the approach that defences could acts as grounds for excluding the criminal responsibility. In its article 31, the Rome Statute puts together defences such as self-defence, which is usually regarded as a justification, and intoxication or insanity, which are usually classified as excuses. The association of such different defences is based on the idea that all are linked with the issue of mens rea. All existing international or national crimes have two constitutive elements: the criminal act by itself (actus reus) and the criminal intent (mens rea).
Insanity or intoxication involve the incapacity to appreciate the unlawfulness of the act. Self-defence excludes the criminal intention, as the intention was to protect life.
The consequence of duress is the suppression of the freedom of choice of the person, thus related to the mens rea of the author. In the Statute, even though the judges of the ICC have the power to refer to these defences as mitigating factors when sentencing the accused, 15 all these defences are potentially "absolute defences", 16 or in other terms "complete defences" which may allow the judges to find the accused non- "As early as reasonably practicable and in any event prior to the commencement of the trials: (...) the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to offer: (a) the defence of alibi (...); (b) any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of mental responsibility; in which case the notification shall specify the names and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the special defence."
Conventions. The accused filed one ground of appeal directed to the issue of "diminished mental responsibility"; a defence that can be found in the ICTY rules of procedure and evidence. The accused argued that "the refusal of the Trial Chamber to define the "special defence" in advance of evidence being given in relation to it denied him a fair trial." 20 The Appeals Chamber pointed out that Article 15 of the ICTY Statute gives power to the judges to adopt "rules of procedure and evidence", thus no power to adopt new defences as such, and that therefore, the accused"s claim that the Statute makes reference to such defence of diminished mental responsibility was unfounded.
Based on customary international law, the Appeals Chamber notably highlighted that the defence based on diminished mental responsibility was clearly different from the defence of insanity included in the ICC Statute. The defence of insanity refers to the destruction of the defendant"s capacity and such annihilation would leads to an acquittal, whereas the defence of diminished mental capacity refers only to the impairment of mental capacity. Such a defence could be relevant only in the matter of mitigation of a sentence. On this point, the Appeals Chamber followed the decision of the Trial Chamber that the accused "was quite capable of controlling his action" and thus rejected his appeal. Thus, in invoking the defence of insanity the defence must demonstrate that the accused was unable to control his or her action at the moment of the illegal act. that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court." Thus, in case of voluntarily intoxication this defence is excluded only if the accused knew, or disregarded the risk that he or she was likely to commit.
III. SELF-DEFENCE
In international law the notion of self-defence tended to apply only to inter-states relationships. Vattel has made the point that for states self-defence is not only a right but also one of the most sacred duties of the state. Nowadays, the right to self-defence for states is part of both customary and conventional international law. 25 Nevertheless, such a right to "self-protection" is conceded to the State under attack and not to the individual facing a charge of war crimes before a court. Thus, such a defence might be recognised for the soldier only in a derivative manner. The Rome Statute clearly makes the difference between the two notions of individual and state self-defence.
Article 31 (c) reads: "The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph". Therefore, even though the state is engaged in a self-defence action, the person involved in such an operation cannot claim that he/she was acting in self-defence.
In criminal law, self-defence is a frequently recognised defence. In the history of criminal law such a right to self-defence was justified by the urgency of the situation, usually laws authorised the victim to protect themselves. This right was to protect another right that was threatened. In such cases public authorities transfer a power which is usually only rightfully exercise by those authorities. Today such a defence is recognized in both common law and civil law. Internationally, the Tokyo tribunal has There are three categories of requirement in the plea of self-defence: (1) the person must have acted "reasonably"
(2) in response to an "imminent and unlawful use of force"
(3) and this act must have been "proportionate to the degree of danger".
The person that claims to have acted under self-defence must have done so "reasonably". Such a notion refers to the reasonability of the act during the circumstances of the case; the accused must have reasonably believed that the use of force and thus the criminal act was necessary to defend himself or someone else. The court would appreciate the perception of the danger of the accused and to what extent the threat was real at the moment of the act. In highlighting that the framing of the "Model Penal Code" contains nearly the same definition of self-defence as the ICC Statute, Bassiouni emphasised that requirement that the defender reasonably believe that forceful response is necessary is a common law requirement which is superfluous for civil law systems. The requirement that the response must be to an imminent and unlawful use of force "may be viewed under the common law as surplusage." 31 In this regard, the Rome Statute established a balance between the common-law requirement and that of the civil law system.
The second requirement that the accused must have acted in reaction to an "imminent and unlawful use of force" can be explained by the fact that the response to the danger must have followed the unlawful use of force. If it is not the case that the accused had responded to such a use of force by another person, it is no longer a case of selfdefence but one of assault.
The third condition is classical and can be found in most of the national criminal systems, the force used to respond to the attack must be proportionate to such an attack. If the response is superior to the degree of danger, such response is no longer justified and regains its illegal character. It is not the result of the act of the defence that will be taken in consideration but rather the intention of the accused. given to life rather than to property, the opposite seems unacceptable. Thus, it is quite difficult to comprehend in what situation the defence of property might be an acceptable defence for war crimes. However, such an inclusion should not be of much concern as the conditions that frame the defence of self-defence are strict and judges would certainly not allow such a defence in many cases. In this regard, this reference to property must be seen as one of the most scandalous concession of a multinational conference where the most important thing was finally to arrive at a consensus.
Under Article 31 (c), the Statute recognises self-defence for a person who "acts reasonably" to defend a property that is "essential for accomplishing a military mission." Even though the defendant would have to respect legal methods of combat, a priori such a position includes the idea that "the end justifies the means"; for military objectives any act necessary for the victory might be a way of defence. 
IV. DURESS
Most national criminal systems admit that criminal responsibility disappears when a person acts in circumstances which have effectively remove the possibility of exercising his or her free will by the effect of a threat to him/her or to a relative. This defence is often call "necessity", "compulsion", or "coercion". 50 On the nuances between these notions, Professor Hall has stated:
There are valid grounds in support of the above noted differences between the doctrines of necessity and coercion. In the former, the pressure which influences the action is physical nature, while coercion it is the immoral and illegal conduct of human beings that create the problem.
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Some legal systems include the two different types of compulsion under the general term of "necessity". The Statute establishes the same link between coercion by another person and compulsion by the circumstances. 52 The common law regime excludes this defence as a complete defence in cases of "the most serious crimes", such as murder, treason, piracy or sexual assault. 53 Such a position is based on the fact that duress is justified by the idea that the accused has avoided a greater harm, thus it does not apply when an individual, to save his or her own life has killed another person. In most of the civil law systems such a defence is admissible. 54 
Duress, necessity, and superior order
At the international level, prior to the Rome Statute, the defence of duress was often linked with the plea of superior orders, and such a defence was considered more as a mitigating factor than as a complete defence. The defence of duress was used several times during the trials following the Second World War. The term used for such 50 Krupp Trial : " The defence of necessity in municipal law is variously termed as "necessity", "compulsion", "force and compulsion", and "coercion and compulsory duress". Nevertheless, the plea of superior orders without a link with coercion was not found admissible, an approach that was confirmed by one of the majority judges at the ICTY in the trial of Erdemovic. 60 The Rome Statute clearly distinguishes between the plea of obedience to superior orders and duress and thus codifies such a difference.
There is a specific provision in article 33 of the ICC statute concerning superior orders. The plea of duress refers to a "threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent bodily harm", whether the threat comes from a superior or not.
Duress as a factor in mitigation only?
A suffered "harmful and irresistible consequences". The judges admitted this defence only because the crime of employing forced labour was not considered a heinous one.
The ICTY reached the same conclusion in the Erdemovic case. As a member of a firing squad, Drazen Erdemovic was involved in the killing of unarmed civilians that followed the fall of the United Nations so-called "safe area" of Srebrenica. 63 When the accused has pleaded guilty for crime against humanity, he declared: With regard to a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber considers that the life of the accused and that of the victim are not fully equivalent. As opposed to ordinary law, the violation here is no longer directed at the physical welfare of the victim alone but at humanity as a whole.
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The Trial Chamber rejected the plea based on duress and the accused was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 66 On appeal, in a 3:2 decision, the judges concluded:
"duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings." 67 As the accused pleaded the defence of duress, a fundamental issue was to define whether the plea of the appellant was equivocal. The judges" opinions stress that the question whether the appellant"s plea was equivocal depended on whether duress can be afforded as a complete defence. According to judges Vohrah, McDonald and Li, duress might be considered as a mitigating factor. 68 Judge Stephen in his separate and dissenting opinion based his dissent on the fact that the accused had pleaded guilty because of the possibility to plead duress as a ground to exclude his criminal liability.
Thus, for judge Stephen, the guilty plea was not unambiguous and was equivocal.
The conclusion of judge Stephen on the application of duress as a complete defence in international law is:
The stringent conditions always surrounding that defence will have to be met, including the requirement that the harm done is not disproportionate to the harm threatened. The case of an accused, forced to take innocent lives which he cannot save and who can only add to the toll by the sacrifice of his own life, is entirely consistent with that requirement.
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In his dissenting opinion, the president of the Appeals Chamber, judge Cassese, highlighted the fact that in international criminal law "duress may generally be urged as a defence, provided certain strict requirements are met; when it cannot be admitted as a defence, duress may nevertheless be acted upon as a mitigation circumstance."
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The definition of duress used by Judge Cassese is clear on that issue: "Duress, namely acting under a threat from a third person of severe and irreparable harm to life or limb, entails that no criminal responsibility is incurred by the person acting under that threat." 71 Cassese based his reflections on the same precedents as the other judges but arrived at the conclusion that:
(...) with regard to war crimes or crimes against humanity whose underlying offences is murder or more generally the taking of life, no special rule of customary international law has evolved on the matter, consequently, even with respect to these offences the general rule on duress applies; it follows that duress may amount to a defence provided that its stringent requirements are met.
The Trial Chamber that pronounced the second sentencing judgement in 1998 reaffirms the ruling used by the appeals chamber that duress can be taken into account only by way of mitigation, but the chamber specified that in this case "there was a real risk that the accused would have been killed had he disobeyed the order.
He voiced his feelings, but realised that he had no choice in the matter: he had to kill or be killed. 
The codification of duress by the Rome Statute
Article 31 (1) (d) classifies duress as a ground to exclude criminal responsibility.
Thus duress is admissible as a complete defence. In this regard, the Rome Statue is clearly an evolution in comparison to the previous rules of international criminal law.
It is worth noting that in the Rome Statute duress is admissible for all the crimes "within the jurisdiction of the Court"; thus such defence is admissible in case of genocide even though if this crime is considered as "the crime of crimes". 73 To understand such evolution it is crucial to focus on the three specific requirements that are included in the statute. In this regards, the Rome Statute operates more as codification rather than an alteration from international jurisprudence. On the 71 Id., para.14 (emphasis added provided that the person does not intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoided." Thus, the defence must be based on "necessity", "reasonability" and "proportionality", thus the statute insures that the "stringent requirements are met."
(a) "The stringent requirement"
Necessity and Reasonability
To invoke duress, the accused must have been in a situation where he/she was absolutely unable to act in conformity with the law. The accused must have undergone a considerable pressure; the doctrine uses the term "irresistible duress". In the Krupp Trial the judges stated:
"(...) the question is to be determined from the standpoint of the honest belief of the particular accused in question…The effect of the alleged compulsion is to be determined not by objective but by subjective standards.
Moreover, as in the case of self-defence, the mere fact that such danger was present is not sufficient. There must be an actual bona fide belief in danger by the particular individual."
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The Krupp Trial pointed out that "the will of the accused be not thereby overpowered but instead coincides with the will of those from whom the alleged compulsion emanates, there is no necessity justifying the illegal conduct." 75 This condition also refers to the fact that there must be no disproportion between the criminal act and the gravity of the threat. Thus, the fact that "the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided" within the Statute has to be seen as a codification of the practice of the judges in the matter of plea of duress. Such a requirement is certainly an answer to those who were afraid that the 74 LRTWC, Vol. X, p.148. 75 Id., p.149.
inclusion of the defence of duress within the Rome Statute would be a denial to the recognition of the specific gravity of the crimes that are under the competence of the ICC. For example, it is on such a requirement that the Trial Chamber of the ICTY rejected the defence of duress as a ground to exclude the criminal intention. In its judgement the Chamber concluded that "proof of the specific circumstances which would fully exonerate the accused of his responsibility has not been provided" and therefore such a defence would have "been taken into account at the same time as other factors in the consideration of mitigating circumstances" 76 .
The notion of "reasonability" is also widely accepted. It refers to the idea that everybody in the same situation would have feared the danger. There must be some circumstances that prove that a "reasonable person" would have felt an imminent physical peril that would have deprived him of his faculty of choice. Traditionally, this notion of "reasonability" refers to three ideas. The accused must have reasonably believed in the existence of the threat, he must have had some reasons to believe that such a threat would have been executed and finally the accused must have been reasonably brave 77 .
Proportionality
In the Rome Statute, the requirement of proportionality comes from the sentence:
"provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided". It is obvious that such a requirement seriously narrows the fear that some have expressed during the drafting of the Statute that such defence will "violate(s) the literal language of the criminal law." 78 Judge Cassese in his dissenting opinion in the Erdemovic case explained: "this requirement cannot normally be met with respect to offences involving the killing of innocents, since it is impossible to balance one life against another". Nevertheless, Cassese added: "in exceptional circumstances this requirement might be met, for example, when the killing would be This Statute must been seen as the codification of a very ancient reflection on the defences admissible in case of criminal offences. It is important to remember that one of the first revolutions in terms of respect for human rights was the codification of criminal offences and defences in order to protect the individual against the partiality and the sole power of the state and the judges. 89 We have to remember that: "law is based on what society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behaviour falling below those standards." 90 The Rome Statute must also be seen as an accomplishment of the declaration made in 1948 in article 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human rights: "Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence." Thus, even though the evolution towards prosecution for deterrence and prevention of the worst crimes is certainly one of the most positive evolutions of the last decade, one should not forget the human rights face of criminal law. In this regard, the new mantra of human rights activist for prosecution only is a dangerous evolution. The Statute has succeeded in finding a balance between the necessity to punish the worst criminal and respecting the fundamental rights of the human beings when facing the human justice.
Even with the codification of the defences in case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the balancing between one life and the life of several innocents will always be the most perilous part of the human justice. As Bassiouni comments: "Even at the risk of one"s life, how can necessity justify or excuse the taking of multiples lives." 91 Finally, even though, the Rome Statute codifies the "ground to exclude the criminal responsibility", however, the list contains in Article 31 is not exhaustive, paragraph 3 refers to Article 21 which provides that the Court shall apply in first place the provisions of the Statute, and "in second place, where appropriate, the principles and the rules of international law", and "falling that, 
